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We study the effects of Massachusetts’ healthcare reform on individuals’ subjective well-being. 
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, we find that the reform 
significantly improved Massachusetts residents’ overall life satisfaction. This result is robust 
to various sensitivity checks and falsification tests. We find consistent evidence from other 
healthcare reforms such as the 2014 Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion and the 2005 
Tennessee Medicaid disenrollment, that support the external validity of our findings. Our 
results provide novel evidence of the psychological consequences of recent healthcare reforms 
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Federal and state governments in the United States have implemented various reforms 
to increase health insurance coverage among the uninsured over the last 15 years. Much 
research has evaluated the effects of these healthcare reforms on outcomes such as health, 
healthcare utilization, household finances, wages, and employment (Chay et al., 2012; 
Finkelstein et al., 2012; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012, 2016; Baicker et al., 2013; Mazumder 
and Miller, 2016; Argys et al., 2017; Brevoort et al., 2018; Koh, 2019). In addition to these 
consequences, healthcare reforms could have a broader impact on well-being that cannot be 
captured fully by these objective measures. This impact can be captured by subjective well-
being (SWB), which is an individual’s self-reported overall well-being.  
Access to health insurance coverage can improve SWB through two major channels. 
First, health insurance coverage can improve financial and health conditions (Courtemanche 
and Zapata, 2014; Mazumder and Miller, 2016; Argys et al., 2017; Brevoort et al., 2018). 
Second, health insurance coverage can provide “peace of mind,” as it removes financial and 
health risks (Arrow, 1963; Nyman, 1999; Haushofer et al., 2018).  
Understanding the effect of healthcare reforms on SWB can provide informative 
evidence on their welfare consequences, which is useful for both economists and 
policymakers. Although a direct approach to conducting welfare analysis is through 
counterfactual policy simulations using structurally estimated parameters, this imposes strong 
modeling assumptions and is computationally challenging.1 To overcome these limitations, 
recently, researchers have used a reduced-form approach combined with SWB data to 
evaluate the welfare impacts of public policies (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005; Alesina et 
al., 2006; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Layard, 2012; Ludwig et al., 2012; Oishi and 
Diener, 2014; Lachowska, 2016; Deaton, 2018) by presuming that SWB data can be a proxy 
for an individual’s (experienced) utility (Kahneman and Sudgen, 2005).2  
 In addition, SWB is an important determinant of major life outcomes such as health, 
social relationships, and labor productivity (Graham, 2008; Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2009; 
Oswald et al., 2015). As such, increasingly more governments are adopting SWB data to 
evaluate the success of public policies (Layard, 2006; Stiglitz et al., 2009).  
                                               
1 This approach goes back to the seminal work of Hausman (1981) that computes the deadweight loss of income 
taxation. Recently, researchers have used the so-called sufficient statistics approach to conduct welfare analysis 
in a relatively simplified manner, combining the advantages of a structural estimation approach and a reduced-
form approach (Chetty, 2006; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2016; Finkelstein et al., 2019).  
2 We acknowledge that SWB data provide little information of the cost-side consequences of a healthcare 
reform or the welfare of other economic agents involved in the reform.  
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This study analyzes the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform’s effects on SWB. This 
reform aimed at achieving near-universal health insurance coverage within the state. To 
identify the effects of this reform on SWB, we compare changes in the SWB levels of 
Massachusetts residents before and after the reform to those of residents in other states using 
the difference-in-differences (DID) approach. We use data from the Behavioral Risk Factor 
Surveillance System (BRFSS) for our empirical analyses.  
We find that the Massachusetts healthcare reform significantly improved residents’ 
SWB. Our graphical analysis indicates a significant, persistent increase in Massachusetts 
residents’ overall life satisfaction after the reform. This graphical evidence is confirmed by 
the regression results using the DID specification. These results are robust when using 
alternative control groups or an alternative measure of SWB. As falsification checks, we find 
little evidence that Massachusetts’s healthcare reform affects life satisfaction of the elderly, 
who are not targeted by the reform.  
Next, we investigate the effects of other healthcare reforms on SWB to test our 
results’ external validity. We first examine the effects of the 2014 Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) Medicaid expansion on SWB. Since the BRFSS does not provide information on 
SWB after 2010, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). In addition, 
we examine Tennessee’s 2005 healthcare reform, which revoked enrollment for some of the 
adult Medicaid population using the BRFSS (Garthwaite et al., 2014; Tello-Trillo, 2016). We 
demonstrate that the ACA Medicaid expansion increased overall life satisfaction, while the 
Tennessee reform decreased it. These results imply that healthcare reforms that expand health 
insurance coverage may improve SWB.  
This study contributes to the literature by providing novel evidence of the 
psychological consequences of the Massachusetts’s healthcare reform. Studies most closely 
related to our research include those by Finkelstein et al. (2012) and Baicker et al. (2013), 
which examine the effects of Oregon’s Medicaid expansion. Recently, Haushofer et al. 
(2018) report experimental evidence regarding the psychological impacts of health 
insurance.3 However, unlike previous studies focusing on healthcare reforms with specific 
populations, such as low-income families or children, our study focuses on a healthcare 
reform that aims for near-universal health insurance coverage. Our analysis of the 2014 ACA 
Medicaid expansion confirms that the recent national healthcare reform also improves 
individuals’ SWB significantly.  
                                               
3 However, Haushofer et al.’s (2018) research setting differs markedly from typical healthcare reforms: the 
health insurance coverage was randomly provided for only a year, free of charge, to 259 informal workers and 
their family members in Kenya. 
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In addition, we contribute to the literature by providing evidence on health insurance 
as an important determinant of SWB. Several studies have examined SWB determinants and 
their quantitative impacts known as the “happiness equation” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2004; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008; Clark et al., 2018). However, the role of health 
insurance has received relatively little attention compared with commonly discussed 
determinants such as income, employment, children, and marriage (Layard, 2005; Dolan, 
Peasgood, and White, 2008). This study shows that health insurance coverage plays an 
important role in determining individuals’ SWB. 
In addition, we contribute to the growing literature estimating public policies’ effects 
on SWB. Existing studies have examined the psychological consequences of major economic 
policies, such as the 2008 stimulus tax rebate program, changes in the minimum wage, 
payroll taxation, and the “Moving-to-Opportunity” program (Ludwig et al., 2012; 
Lachowska, 2016; Kuroki, 2018; Kim and Koh, 2019a). Our study offers novel evidence 
regarding how a healthcare reform can affect individuals’ SWB.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
background of the Massachusetts health insurance reform, SWB, and potential mechanisms. 
Sections 3 and 4 present the data and empirical strategy, respectively. Section 5 presents 
evidence on the Massachusetts healthcare reform’s effects on SWB and examines the internal 
and external validities of our findings. Section 6 provides our conclusions.  
2. Background 
A. Massachusetts Healthcare Reform 
 
The Massachusetts healthcare reform was legislated in April 2006 to provide nearly-
universal health insurance coverage within the state. Except for a few cases,4 all residents 
were mandated to have health insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty. In addition, employers 
with more than 10 full-time employees were required to offer employer-sponsored health 
insurance coverage or pay a tax penalty. Furthermore, the Massachusetts reform expanded the 
pre-existing Medicaid program to increase low-income families’ health insurance coverage.5 
These features of the Massachusetts reform were adopted in the ACA, the nationwide 
                                               
4 For example, if individuals can prove that even subsidized health insurance plans being sold at the 
government-established health insurance marketplace are unaffordable, they can be exempted from the 
individual mandate. 
5 Implementation of the reform partially began from July 2006, but the full implementation was not in effect 
until July 2007.  
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healthcare reform legislated in 2010. McDonough et al. (2006) and Courtemanche and Zapata 
(2014) provide institutional details of the reform. 
Figure 1 illustrates that the proportion of adults in Massachusetts aged 18 to 64 years 
with health insurance coverage sharply increased to approximately 95 percent after the 
reform, without a similar increase in other states. Long et al. (2009) report that the uninsured 
rate decreased by 6.6 percent for all adults and 17.3 percent for lower-income adults.  
Several studies examine the consequences of the Massachusetts healthcare reform for 
both medical care utilization and health. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) show that the reform 
decreased the length of hospital stays and number of inpatient admissions from emergency 
room. Miller (2012, 2013) documents an increased use of primary and preventive healthcare 
services. Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) provide evidence of improved self-assessed 
health. Sommers et al. (2014) reveal that the reform significantly decreased mortality.  
In addition, the Massachusetts healthcare reform affected household finances and 
labor market outcomes. Mazumder and Miller (2016) indicate that the reform improved 
households’ financial outcomes, including credit scores, overdue debt amounts, personal 
bankruptcies, and third-party collections. Kolstad and Kowalski (2016) discover a substantial 
compensating differential for employer-provided health insurance coverage due to the 
reform. Dillender et al. (2016) report that the employer mandate increased the probability of 
part-time work.  
B. Subjective Well-Being 
  
SWB is an increasingly popular measure of the quality of life in social sciences and 
the public policy arena. It is a measure of well-being that not only covers cognitive evaluation 
of one’s life in general but also captures both pleasant and painful experiences. Data on SWB 
are typically collected from responses to questions on overall life satisfaction or happiness. 
Acknowledging its importance, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission, established by French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008, urged statistical offices to include SWB questions in their 
surveys and use this information to assess individuals’ quality of life and the effectiveness of 
public policies (Stiglitz et al., 2009).  
 There might be concerns regarding the use of self-reported SWB data to evaluate the 
impact of public policy. Several studies have tested SWB measurements’ validity by 
examining the correlations between self-reported life satisfaction and other indicators of well-
being. For example, Diener and Suh (1999), Layard (2005), Graham (2008), and Frey and 
Stutzer (2010) indicate that frequency of smiling, friends’ ratings of one’s happiness, frequent 
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verbal expressions of positive emotions, sociability, sleep quality, close relatives’ happiness, 
health, income, active involvement in religion, and recent positive changes in one’s 
circumstances correlate with an individual’s life satisfaction. Urry et al. (2004) also provide 
neuroscientific evidence that SWB measures highly correlate with activities in the brain’s left 
prefrontal cortex, which is associated with the processing of pleasure. 
C. Possible Mechanisms 
 
The Massachusetts healthcare reform can affect individuals’ SWB through various 
channels. It is noteworthy that the mechanisms we discuss in this subsection are not mutually 
exclusive, and our data do not allow us to quantify each mechanism’s relative importance. 
 First, the Massachusetts healthcare reform can increase SWB by improving 
individuals’ health and financial conditions. Previous studies have shown that the reform 
leads to better health (Miller, 2012, 2013; Courtemanche and Zapata, 2014; Sommers et al., 
2014) and financial conditions (Mazumder and Miller, 2016). These ex-post improvements in 
health and household finances can improve SWB (Graham, 2008; Clark et al., 2018; 
Lindqvist et al., 2018). This mechanism could take time to affect SWB as chronic health 
conditions and household financial outcomes are unlikely to adjust immediately.  
Second, the Massachusetts reform can improve SWB by increasing individuals’ 
“peace of mind,” even without improvements in their health or financial distress, as health 
insurance helps individuals by insuring them against catastrophic medical expenditure shocks 
and negative health shocks (Arrow, 1963; Nyman, 1999). This ex-ante risk-reduction could 
induce individuals to be more satisfied with their life in general by decreasing anxiety or 
stress (Haushofer et al., 2018). In particular, this mechanism can improve SWB as soon as the 
reform is expected to be legislated.  
Finally, there could be a secondary mechanism through which the Massachusetts 
reform can decrease individuals’ SWB. Kolstad and Kowalski (2016) indicate that the 
employer mandate decreases the wages and working hours of full-time workers who gain 
employer-provided health insurance coverage. Dillender et al. (2016) find that the employer 
mandate increases the share of part-time employment among low-skilled workers, as 
employers do not need to offer health insurance coverage to part-time workers. These results 
imply that decreased earnings due to the reform could decrease SWB if the earnings 




A. BRFSS, 2005–2010 
We use data from the BRFSS for the empirical analysis. The BRFSS comprises state-
based, cross-sectional data surveyed annually in the United States. This survey interviews a 
random sample of nationally representative adults by telephone, aged 18 years or older. The 
data provide detailed information on measures of SWB, health, healthcare utilization, health 
insurance coverage, and other characteristics of individuals. 
Our key dependent variable is an individual’s overall life satisfaction. The BRFSS 
asks respondents, “In general, how satisfied are you with your life?” A respondent can 
answer “very satisfied,” “satisfied,” “dissatisfied,” or “very dissatisfied.” We treat this as a 
cardinal variable by assigning a value of 1 to “very dissatisfied” and 4 to “very satisfied,” 
following the SWB literature (Dehejia et al., 2007; Oswald and Powdthavee, 2008; Oswald 
and Wu, 2011).6 The BRFSS also asks, “Now thinking about your mental health, which 
includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many days during the past 
30 days was your mental health not good?” In addition to the overall life satisfaction variable, 
which is relatively evaluative, we use the responses to this question as a relatively 
experiential (affective) measure of SWB.  
We consider the years from 2005 to 2010 as the sample period, because the life 
satisfaction question was surveyed in all states only during this time frame.7 The life 
satisfaction question was not included in the 2011 and 2012 surveys due to a major change in 
the survey method in 2011, and only five states have intermittently included the life 
satisfaction question again in their surveys since 2013.8  
Massachusetts’ healthcare reform was intended to increase health insurance coverage 
among the non-elderly, as those aged 65 years and older are covered by Medicare; thus, we 
restrict our sample to those aged 18 to 64 years. If the reform indeed affected only the non-
elderly, we should observe that it has few impacts on the overall life satisfaction level of the 
elderly. Hence, estimating the effects of Massachusetts’s health reform using the elderly 
sample can serve as a falsification test. 
                                               
6 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) find that assuming cardinality or ordinality of a happiness measure in 
the German socio-economic panel survey makes little difference when estimating determinants of happiness.  
7 We exclude individuals who reside in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands from the sample; however, 
the results are robust when including these sample individuals.  
8 Louisiana included the overall life satisfaction question in its 2016 and 2017 surveys; Minnesota in 2014, 
2015, 2016, and 2017; Mississippi in 2013 and 2014; Rhode Island in 2015 and 2016; and Tennessee in 2013, 
2016, and 2017.  
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B. PSID, 2009–2017 
The main focus of this study is on estimating the SWB impacts of Massachusetts’ 
healthcare reform. However, we also study the effects of the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansion 
on SWB to examine the external validity of our main analyses. Unfortunately, we cannot use 
the BRFSS data due to the absence of life satisfaction data after 2010. We overcome this 
limitation by using data from the PSID, which is a nationally representative bi-annual (since 
1999) panel survey of U.S. households and has been collecting information on overall life 
satisfaction since 2009. Specifically, it asks the following question: “Please think about your 
life as a whole. How satisfied are you with it? Are you completely satisfied, very satisfied, 
somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?” We assign the value of 1 to 
“not at all satisfied”, 2 to “not very satisfied”, 3 to “somewhat satisfied”, 4 to “very satisfied”, 
and 5 to “completely satisfied.”  
4. Empirical Strategy 
 
To identify the effects of the Massachusetts healthcare reform on SWB, we compare 
the changes in self-reported life satisfaction of Massachusetts residents with those of other 
states before and after the reform. We consider the following DID specification to implement 
this research design: 
  𝐿𝑆#$% = 𝛽( + 𝛽*𝑀𝐴$ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% + 𝛿$ + 𝜃% + 𝛽4𝑋#$% + 𝜀#$%                   (1) 
 
where 𝐿𝑆#$% is the level of overall life satisfaction of individual i living in state s in year t, 𝑀𝐴$ denotes a binary indicator of whether a respondent lives in Massachusetts, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% 
indicates whether the calendar year is 2007 or after, 𝑋#$% is a vector of individual 
characteristics related to overall life satisfaction, and 𝜀#$%is an error term. We calculate 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level by allowing for 
serial correlation within a state. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽*, represents the Massachusetts 
healthcare reform’s causal effect on overall life satisfaction; 𝛿$ captures the time-invariant, 
state-specific, unobserved heterogeneity; and 𝜃%, the year-fixed effect, controls for any 
common trend affecting individuals’ life satisfaction over time.  
The key identification assumption in the DID approach is that life-satisfaction trends 
between Massachusetts and the other states are common in the absence of the Massachusetts 
healthcare reform (Wing et al., 2018). To test the validity of this assumption, we need to 
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examine whether these trends of overall life satisfaction are parallel before the reform. 
However, it is difficult to justify this assumption in our setting, since only two years (2005 
and 2006) of pre-reform life satisfaction data are available from the BRFSS.  
To overcome several empirical issues arising from this limitation, we use several 
alternative control groups to study the sensitivity of our baseline results. First, the DID 
estimates can be biased due to heterogeneity across states (Issue 1). The short pre-reform 
periods’ data may not guarantee that state-fixed effects sufficiently control for the 
heterogeneity across states. To address this issue, we use other northeastern states as 
alternative control states by assuming that, due to their close proximity, the characteristics of 
these states are much more similar than those of the baseline control states.9 Additionally, we 
construct a “synthetic Massachusetts” as the most comparable to Massachusetts before the 
reform, in terms of overall life satisfaction as well as the control variables, following Abadie 
et al. (2010).  
Second, our estimates can be biased due to time-varying unobserved confounding 
factors (Issue 2). The Great Recession of 2008 to 2009 (officially, December 2007 to June 
2009) could have affected overall life satisfaction differently across states over time. For 
example, if individuals in Massachusetts experienced less severe recession shocks than did 
individuals in the control states during the post-reform period, then Massachusetts residents 
might have higher overall life satisfaction than do residents in the control states. We 
indirectly address this issue by comparing Massachusetts and states with similar reductions in 
the proportion of employed individuals during the recession period.10  
Third, our baseline estimates can be biased due to both Issues 1 and 2 (Issue 3). To 
further investigate the sensitivity of our baseline estimates, we construct another “synthetic 
Massachusetts” among states that experienced similar recession shocks.  
Our approaches to address Issues 2 and 3 presume that the Great Recession is the 
leading time-varying confounding factor. However, other unknown time-varying factors 
could cause a bias in our estimates. To address this bias, we use the fact that the 
Massachusetts healthcare reform only targets non-elderly individuals. We use the elderly 
sample for a falsification check. We also examine changes in life satisfaction between the 
non-elderly and elderly in Massachusetts using the elderly as an additional control group. 
Since it is possible that the Great Recession had different effects on the elderly, we compare 
                                               
9 We include Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania.  
10 Table A1 in the Appendix lists states with similar changes in the proportion of employed individuals (i.e., +/- 
1 percentage point of Massachusetts’ change in the share of employed individuals out of the non-elderly 
population, aged 18 to 64 years).  
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changes in life-satisfaction gaps between the non-elderly and elderly to those of the baseline 
control states by using the following triple DID (TD) specification: 
 𝐿𝑆#$% = 𝛾( + 𝛾*𝑀𝐴$ ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡% ∗ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦# + 𝛿$ + 𝜃% + 𝛾4𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦# + 𝛾@𝑋#$% + 𝜔#$%,		(2) 
 
where NonElderly indicates non-elderly individuals aged 18 to 64 years. In the regression 
analysis, we include the two-way interaction terms among MA, Post, and NonElderly but do 
not show them above to save space. Otherwise, we follow the same notations and use the 
same control variables used in regression specification (1). The coefficient of the triple 
interaction term, 𝛾*, is the coefficient of interest, which captures differential effects of the 
Massachusetts healthcare reform on overall life satisfaction of non-elderly individuals 
compared with elderly individuals.  
To examine whether the treatment and control groups have similar characteristics 
during the pre-reform periods, we present summary statistics of sample characteristics in 
Table 1. Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of overall life satisfaction before 
the Massachusetts healthcare reform. It is noteworthy that the average values of overall life 
satisfaction are similar between Massachusetts and the baseline control states (the other 
states) and the four alternative control groups before the reform. Similar to the average life 
satisfaction score, the distributions of overall life satisfaction are also similar between 
Massachusetts and these control states. Approximately 45% and 50% of residents reported 
that they are very satisfied and satisfied with their lives, respectively, while only 5% to 6% of 
residents reported that they are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their life in 
general. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of mental health, measured by the number 
of days on which mental health was not good in the past 30 days. Consistent with the results 
of overall life satisfaction, residents of Massachusetts and of other states experienced stress, 
depression, and problems with emotions over a similar number of days.  
Panel C describes the resident characteristics of Massachusetts compared with those 
in these five control groups. Generally, Massachusetts residents are more likely to be white, 
college educated, and employed, and thus, they have higher income than residents of other 
states do. We control for individuals’ characteristics related to overall life satisfaction by 
including resident characteristics such as age, age squared, number of children, college 
education, marital status, gender, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic origin). We do not control for 
employment status and household income in the baseline analysis, as the employer mandate 
of Massachusetts’ healthcare reform can affect employment, wages, and working hours, and, 
consequently, family income (Dillender et al., 2016; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2016). However, 
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as a robustness check, we include household income and employment as additional control 
variables.    
5. Empirical Results 
A. Main Results 
Figure 2 illustrates the trends of overall life satisfaction among the non-elderly, aged 
18 to 64 years, in Massachusetts and other states from 2005 to 2010. Little difference in 
overall life satisfaction is observed between the residents of Massachusetts and of other states 
until 2006, when the Massachusetts healthcare reform was legislated. Only Massachusetts 
residents experienced an increase in overall life satisfaction relative to those of other states 
after 2007.  
 Table 2 reports the results of estimating the effects of Massachusetts’ healthcare 
reform using regression specification (1). Panel A illustrates that the estimation results are 
consistent with the findings from Figure 2. Column (1) indicates that the Massachusetts 
healthcare reform increased overall life satisfaction by 0.04 when estimated without any 
individual characteristics as control variables. The result is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Columns (2), (3), and (4) add individual characteristics, state- and year-fixed effects, 
and state- and year-month-fixed effects, respectively.11 In columns (2)-(4), we find that the 
Massachusetts reform increased the overall life satisfaction by approximately 0.03, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns (5) to (8) demonstrate that the results are 
robust when using alternative dependent variables. Columns (5) and (6) reveal that the 
Massachusetts reform increased the probability of being either very satisfied or satisfied, 
respectively, with life in general by approximately 1 percentage point. Columns (7) and (8) 
demonstrate that the Massachusetts reform increased the probability of being very satisfied 
with life in general by approximately 2 percentage points. These estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Our results are similar when we additionally control for household 
income and employment (Table A2 in the Appendix).12  
                                               
11 The coefficient estimates of MA and Post, based on column (2) of Table 2, are -0.009 (SE of 0.006) and -
0.026 (SE of 0.003), respectively. The small and insignificant difference in overall life-satisfaction levels 
between Massachusetts and other states during the pre-reform periods is consistent with the findings of Table 1 
and Figure 1. The coefficient estimate of Post indicates that life satisfaction of the control states decreased 
during the post-reform periods, presumably due to the Great Recession. 
12 If marital status is affected by the reform, controlling for marital status can cause a bias. To examine this 
issue, we excluded marital status from the regression analysis as a robustness check. The estimated effect of the 
reform on overall life satisfaction (i.e., coefficient value of MA*Post) was 0.035 with the SE of 0.004, similar to 
that of the baseline estimates. Given this finding, we argue that marriage is less likely to be a mediator or cause 
a bias in our estimation.  
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The baseline analysis uses 2007 as the reference year, because the Massachusetts 
reform was fully implemented after July 2007. As discussed in Section 2.C, health insurance 
can reduce (ex-ante) health and financial risks (Arrow, 1963; Nyman, 1999). This implies 
that the reform might have improved individuals’ overall life satisfaction even before it was 
fully implemented (transition period) through anticipation. We test the reform’s differential 
effects between the transition period and the period after its full implementation by dividing 
the post-reform period into the transition period (captured by the During dummy variable) 
and the full implementation period (captured by the After dummy variable), and we repeat the 
regression analyses conducted in panel A of Table 2. During represents the period between 
July 2006 and June 2007, following Kolstad and Kowalski (2012), while After represents the 
period after July 2007. Panel B shows that the improvements in overall life satisfaction 
mostly arise after the reform’s full implementation and not during the transition period. For 
example, the coefficient estimates of the reform impact on overall life satisfaction during the 
transition periods range from -0.007 to 0.005 points in columns (2) to (4). The probabilities of 
being either very satisfied or satisfied or being very satisfied with life in columns (5) to (8) 
increased only by about 0.3 percentage points. However, the magnitudes of the reform’s 
SWB effects after the full implementation are around 0.03 in columns (2) to (4), 1 percentage 
point in columns (5) and (6), and 2 percentage points in columns (7) and (8), respectively. 
The coefficient estimates on the reform impact after the full implementation period are 
generally similar to those in panel A.13 These results imply that there have been little 
anticipation impacts of the reform on individuals’ life satisfaction. 
In panel C of Table 2, we study how the Massachusetts healthcare reform’s effects on 
overall life satisfaction have evolved over time. We split the Post dummy variable into two 
parts, Post1 and Post2, indicating the periods from 2007 to 2008 and 2009 to 2010, 
respectively. The effects of the reform during the first and second halves are around 0.03 
points in columns (2) to (4). Dynamic impacts of the reform on the binary indicator of life 
satisfaction show similar patterns. The reform increased the probability of being either 
satisfied or very satisfied by about 0.8 percentage points during the first half and by 1.3 
percentage points during the second half, and it increased the probability of being very 
satisfied by 2.2 percentage points during the first half and 1.9 percentage points during the 
second half. These results imply that the reform’s estimated effects on SWB persist over 
time, consistent with the findings from Figure 2. One possible explanation for these patterns 
is that different mechanisms may be at play in different periods. There could be immediate 
                                               
13 We also use a slightly different definition of the During period—April 2006 to June 2007—following 
Courtemanche and Zapata (2014). The results are robust, as reported in Table A3 of the Appendix.  
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improvements in SWB through ex-ante reductions in financial and health risks. Previous 
studies on the effects of major life events, such as marriage, divorce, widowhood, and 
unemployment, on SWB showed that people adapt in terms of life satisfaction (Clark et al., 
2008). If ex-ante reductions are the only mechanism for improvement in SWB, individuals 
might have adapted after the reform. However, we find little evidence of such adaptation. The 
lack of adaptation can be achieved through ex-post improvements in financial and health 
conditions, which take some time to build health and financial capital.  
The Massachusetts healthcare reform’s impacts on overall life satisfaction could be 
heterogeneous by individual characteristics. First, we examine the reform’s heterogeneous 
effects by age. The reform expanded health insurance coverage to the entire population of the 
uninsured; thus, it increased health insurance coverage for younger individuals (aged 18 to 34 
years) relatively more than that for older individuals (panel A of Table A4 in the Appendix), 
as younger individuals are more likely to be uninsured. Hence, we conjecture that the 
reform’s life satisfaction effects would be larger among younger than older individuals. 
Consistent with this conjecture, panel A in Table 3 shows that the younger group exhibits the 
largest improvement in overall life satisfaction. The reform increased life satisfaction by 0.05 
points among individuals aged 18 to 34 years; while it increased life satisfaction by 0.009 
points among individuals aged 55 to 64 years.14 Although we observe a larger improvement 
in overall life satisfaction among younger individuals, Courtemanche and Zapata (2014) find 
larger improvements in health among older individuals. The fact that younger individuals 
experienced a larger SWB improvement despite a relatively modest health improvement 
implies that the peace of mind from having health insurance coverage could be a primary 
mechanism to explain the observed patterns in the data. These results provide evidence that 
SWB accounts for different aspects of individuals’ welfare, which are not fully captured by 
health status.  
Second, we study heterogeneous impacts by individuals’ income. Long et al. (2009) 
find that the reform decreased the uninsured rate among low-income individuals more 
significantly than among high-income individuals (panel B of Table A4 in the Appendix). If 
the reform increased SWB through an increase in health insurance coverage, we expect that 
the reform would have larger impacts among low-income individuals than among high-
income individuals. Panel B in Table 3 indicates that this is indeed the case. The reform 
increased life satisfaction by 0.06 points among individuals whose family income is lower 
than $25,000 while it increased life satisfaction by 0.03 points among individuals whose 
                                               
14 The impacts of the reform on life satisfaction do not monotonically change by age. One possible explanation 
is the non-monotonic increases in health insurance coverage across ages (panel A of Table A4). 
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family income is higher than $75,000. These results imply that the healthcare reform 
decreased inequality in SWB by income.15  
B. Internal Validity 
 We analyze the main results’ internal validity by conducting several robustness and 
falsification checks.  
First, one might be concerned that Massachusetts differs from the other states in 
various dimensions, as discussed in Section 4. We test our findings’ robustness by 
considering alternative control groups. Figure 3 plots the trends of overall life satisfaction by 
using different control groups. Panel A compares Massachusetts against other northeastern 
states that are geographically close. Panel B compares Massachusetts against the states 
chosen by the synthetic control method. Panel C compares Massachusetts against states that 
experienced similar recession shocks. Panel D compares Massachusetts against the “synthetic 
Massachusetts” control constructed by using states with similar recession shocks. Weights for 
constructing the synthetic control states in panels B and D are available in panels A and B of 
Table A5 in the Appendix. We observe consistent patterns regardless of the control groups’ 
definitions in the sense that i) a parallel trend exists before the Massachusetts reform between 
Massachusetts and the control states, and ii) Massachusetts’ overall life satisfaction level 
increased compared with that of the control states after the reform. The regression results 
reported in Table 4 are robust under the alternative control groups in panels A to D. The 
estimated effects of the reform on i) overall life satisfaction in column (1), ii) probability of 
either being satisfied or very satisfied in life in column (2), and iii) probability of being very 
satisfied in column (3) are from 0.027 to 0.037 points, 0.9 to 1.2 percentage points, and 1.6 to 
2.5 percentage points, respectively. The results are also robust when using the ordered logit 
specification (Table A6 in the Appendix).  
 Second, in the baseline regression analysis, we calculate clustered standard errors to 
correct for the serial correlation within each state. However, we have only one treatment state 
(Massachusetts). Clustering standard errors at the state level might not be the most 
conservative approach for statistical inferences (Buchmueller et al., 2011). We address this 
concern by conducting Fisher’s (1935) permutation test. We first assign a “fake” treatment 
status to one of the other states after excluding Massachusetts from the sample. Subsequently, 
we estimate the “fake” treatment effects by using regression specification (1). Finally, we 
                                               
15 However, we do not have a clear explanation regarding why the effect of the Massachusetts reform on life 
satisfaction among individuals in the middle income group ($25,000 to $75,000) level is smaller than that in the 
higher income group (>$75,000). 
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repeat this exercise for the other 49 states. Figure 4 plots the DID estimates of the “fake” 
treatment effects. The distribution reveals the possible estimates under the null hypothesis 
that the Massachusetts healthcare reform does not affect individuals’ overall life satisfaction. 
We indicate our baseline estimate with a solid vertical line; the baseline estimate remains 
outside the dashed lines, which represent the 5th and 95th percentile values of the estimated 
“fake” treatment effects. This exercise implies that the baseline estimate is still statistically 
significant under an alternative metric for statistical inference.  
Third, we examine the Massachusetts healthcare reform’s effects on an alternative 
measure of SWB: number of days on which mental health was not good in the past 30 days. 
Given the negative relationship between life satisfaction and mental health (Oswald and Wu 
2011), we expect that the reform improved mental health. Figure A1 shows trends of the 
mental health of the residents of Massachusetts and several control states. In panel A, we use 
the baseline control states. In panels B to E, we use i) other northeastern states, ii) states used 
for constructing the “synthetic Massachusetts”, iii) states that experienced similar recession 
shocks, and iv) states used for constructing “synthetic Massachusetts” among those with 
similar recession shocks. These graphs generally show that days of mental health not good in 
the past 30 days decreased in Massachusetts as opposed to the control groups once the reform 
was implemented. Column (1) in Table 5 shows that the Massachusetts healthcare reform 
reduced the number of days on which mental health was not good in the past 30 days by 
approximately 0.165 days, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Columns (2) to 
(5) indicate that the results are robust when using the alternative control groups. The 
estimated effects are from -0.243 to -0.144 days, which are statistically significant at the 1% 
or 5% level.16  
 Fourth, we conduct a falsification test using the elderly sample, as individuals aged 65 
years and over are covered by Medicare. If the observed increase in the non-elderly’s overall 
life satisfaction after 2007 indeed occurred due to the Massachusetts healthcare reform, the 
reform would have little impact on the elderly’s life satisfaction. Figure 5 plots trends of the 
elderly’s overall life satisfaction in Massachusetts and other states; no differential trends were 
found for the period from 2005 to 2010. In fact, the overall life satisfaction level of the 
elderly in Massachusetts was even lower in 2009 than in other states. Table 6 reports that the 
reform did not increase the elderly’s life satisfaction regardless of the definitions of control 
states or outcome variables in panels A to E. The estimated effects of the reform on the 
elderly’s i) overall life satisfaction, ii) probability of either being satisfied or very satisfied, 
                                               
16 We use the days of bad mental health as a robustness check for the baseline finding and acknowledge that a 
similar finding using this measure has been reported in Van der Wees (2013). 
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and iii) probability of being very satisfied are from -0.022 to -0.0004 points in column (1), -
0.4 to -0.2 percentage points in column (2), and -1.8 to 0.3 percentage points in column (3), 
respectively.  
 Finally, we use the elderly group as an additional control group. In Figure 6, we plot 
trends of differences in overall life satisfaction between the non-elderly aged below 65 and 
the elderly aged 65 and above in both Massachusetts and the baseline control states. The 
figure shows that life satisfaction sharply increases among the non-elderly compared with the 
elderly in Massachusetts once the reform was introduced. This finding provides additional 
evidence that the reform has indeed increased SWB. However, we find little change in 
differences in life satisfaction between the non-elderly and the elderly in control states. We 
estimate these differential changes in life satisfaction between the non-elderly and elderly 
across states by using regression specification (2) in Table 7. Column (1) of panel A shows 
that the reform increased the cardinal value of life satisfaction by 0.04 points, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are qualitatively similar when using the 
binary indicators of life satisfaction in columns (2) and (3). The reform increased the 
probability of either being satisfied or very satisfied and the probability of being very 
satisfied by 1.2 and 2.7 percentage points, which are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The results are also robust when using the aforementioned alternative control groups in 
panels B to E. The estimated effects of the reform on the i) overall life satisfaction, ii) 
probability of either being satisfied or very satisfied, and iii) probability of being very 
satisfied are 0.027 to 0.052 points in column (1), 1.1 to 1.3 percentage points in column (2), 
and 1.3 to 4.0 percentage points in column (3).  
C. External Validity 
Although we find robust evidence that the Massachusetts healthcare reform increased 
individuals’ SWB, this might not necessarily apply to other contexts due to the significant 
heterogeneity across states. Thus, we assess our findings’ external validity by studying two 
other healthcare reforms’ impacts on SWB: the i) ACA Medicaid expansion in 2014 and ii) 




ACA Medicaid Expansion in 201417 
The ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility to people earning up to 138% of the federal poverty 
level, as part of the largest expansion of coverage to non-elderly adults. Although the 
expansion was originally intended to be enacted nationally, a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court 
decision made it optional for the states. Thus, some states decided not to expand Medicaid 
eligibility. To identify the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion, we compare changes in 
SWB measured by overall life satisfaction of the residents in “expansion states” and “non-
expansion states” before and after 2014 using the PSID, 2009–2017.18 To implement this 
research design, we use a DID specification. Specifically, we replace MA with Treat in the 
regression specification (1) in which Treat is a binary indicator of the “expansion states” and 
Post is 1 if calendar year is 2015 or 2017, and 0 otherwise. Other than these changes, we 
follow the same notations and use the same control variables as in regression specification 
(1).  
 Panel A of Figure 7 shows trends of non-elderly individuals’ life satisfaction for 
expansion and non-expansion states during 2009 to 2017.19 It shows that individuals in 
expansion states had lower SWB than those in non-expansion states before the ACA 
Medicaid expansion. However, the SWB level in expansion states increased after the 
introduction of the reform, and it became larger than SWB in non-expansion states. We then 
estimate the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion on Medicaid coverage and SWB. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 8. Column (1) shows that the expansion increased 
Medicaid coverage among individuals aged 18 to 64 years by 4.2 percentage points, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.20 Column (2) shows that the expansion increased life 
satisfaction by 0.052 points, which is statistically at the 1% level. While we do not report the 
results to save space, they are robust under alternative specifications. It is noteworthy that the 
PSID measures the overall life satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 5, while the BRFSS data report 
overall life satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 4. Hence, we multiply the ACA Medicaid expansion 
estimate (0.052) by 0.8 to compare the ACA Medicaid expansion estimate to that of the 
Massachusetts reform. The adjusted coefficient estimate is about 0.042, which is slightly 
bigger than our baseline estimates reported in Table 2.   
                                               
17 We thank the editor for her suggestion to include the analysis of the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansion 
on life satisfaction.  
18 Following Simon et al. (2017), we define treatment states as states that expanded Medicaid by December 
2015 and control states as states that did not expand Medicaid or expanded later than December 2015. 
19 We borrow the results presented in Panel A of Figure 7 and columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 from Kim and 
Koh(2019b).  
20 We use data from the American Community Survey, 2009–2017.  
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Tennessee’s Medicaid Disenrollment in 2005 
Tennessee discontinued the expansion of its Medicaid program (TennCare) in 2005, and 
approximately 170,000 adults abruptly lost their Medicaid coverage (Garthwaite et al., 2014). 
We use other southern states as control states to determine the effect of the Tennessee 
Medicaid disenrollment using BRFSS data. We define the post-reform period as the survey 
months after August 2005.21 Panel B of Figure 7 shows life satisfaction trends of individuals 
aged 18 to 64 years in Tennessee and other Southern states. It demonstrates that life 
satisfaction sharply decreased one year after the disenrollment, while there were minimal 
changes in life satisfaction among residents in the control states. Next, we estimate the effects 
of TennCare disenrollment on any health insurance coverage and life satisfaction by using the 
DID specification. The estimation results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8. 
Specifically, we replace MA with Treat in the regression specification (1) in which Treat is a 
binary indicator of treatment states and Post is 1 if the calendar year is July 2005 and after, 
and 0 otherwise. Other than these changes, we follow the same notations and use the same 
control variables as in regression specification (1). Column (3) indicates that Tennessee’s 
Medicaid disenrollment decreased the proportion of adults aged 18 to 64 years with any 
health insurance coverage by 6.3 percentage points. Column (4) demonstrates that the 
Medicaid disenrollment decreased overall life satisfaction in Tennessee by 0.029 percentage 
points. It is noteworthy that we use only one year as the pre-reform period due to the data 
limitation of the BRFSS. Nevertheless, this result provides another evidence of the external 
validity of our main findings.22  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
We provide novel evidence that Massachusetts’ 2006 healthcare reform significantly 
improved individuals’ SWB, as measured by the self-reported level of overall life 
satisfaction. Various robustness checks and falsification tests support our causal inference. 
Analyses of the 2014 ACA Medicaid expansion and 2005 Tennessee Medicaid disenrollment 
provide evidence of external validity of our findings.  
                                               
21 Other southern states include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, South Carolina, and West 
Virginia. The reverification of Medicaid eligibility for disenrollment in Tennessee began in late July 2005 
(Garthwaite et al., 2014). We use the same set of control variables used in regression specification (1).  
22 Although Tello-Trillo (2016) does not examine life satisfaction, he finds consistent evidence that the number 
of days with poor mental health increased after the disenrollment of Medicaid in Tennessee.  
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To further discuss the magnitude of the Massachusetts reform with other public 
policies, we first calculate the average SWB improvement per health insurance coverage via 
the reform, which is approximately 0.54 point or a 0.83 standard deviation (SD) of overall 
life satisfaction.23 Then, we compare this metric to those of several studies that examine the 
SWB impacts of public policies such as “Moving to Opportunity” (MTO), minimum wage, 
and tax rebate during the Great Recession in the United States. Ludwig et al. (2012) find that 
a 10-percentage-point reduction in tract poverty due to MTO increased life satisfaction by 
0.11 SD. Kuroki (2018) demonstrates that a 100% increase in minimum wages raises life 
satisfaction by about 0.4 SD among individuals who dropped out of high school. Lachowska 
(2016) indicates that the $950 stimulus tax rebate during the recession increased life 
satisfaction by 0.32 SD. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that a 0.83 SD-
increase in life satisfaction could be generated by reducing track poverty by about 27 
percentage points, increasing minimum wage by around 200%, or providing a stimulus tax 
rebate of approximately $2,500 during the Great Recession. The comparisons indicate that 
access to health insurance has a large, positive impact on an individual’s overall life 
satisfaction.  
Finally, we discuss whether health insurance gains under different reforms have 
similar effects on SWB. We first compute the average improvements in life satisfaction per 
health insurance coverage under the ACA Medicaid expansion and find that it is 
approximately 1.04 SD.24 The results indicate that SWB impacts are larger when the increase 
in health insurance coverage is achieved through the ACA Medicaid expansion than through 
the Massachusetts healthcare reform, probably because the ACA Medicaid expansion only 
targets low-income individuals, while the Massachusetts reform targets a broader range of 
individuals. Since the effects of health insurance on life satisfaction can be heterogeneous by 
individuals’ socioeconomic status (Panel B of Table 3), this heterogeneity in population 
characteristics might explain different magnitudes across healthcare reforms. Meanwhile, we 
find that the average reduction in life satisfaction per health insurance coverage of the 
Tennessee’s Medicaid disenrollment is around 0.69 SD, which is similar to the SWB impacts 
of health insurance gain through Massachusetts’s reform.25 Interestingly, the SWB impacts of 
                                               
23 Since Kolstad and Kowalski (2012) estimate that the Massachusetts healthcare reform increased health 
insurance coverage by 5.7 percentage points, the average SWB improvement per health insurance coverage is 
0.54 (=0.031/0.057). The SD of life satisfaction in column (1) of Table 1 is 0.65, and thus, the average SWB 
improvement per health insurance coverage is 0.83 SD (=0.54/0.65).  
24 The SWB impact per health insurance coverage is around 0.88 points (=0.052/0.042). We transform this into 
the SD of life satisfaction of the sample used in column (2) of Table 8, which is 0.12 SD (=0.88/0.85).  
25 The SWB impacts per health insurance coverage under the Tennessee reform is around 0.46 points (= -
0.029/-0.063). We compare this magnitude to the SD of life satisfaction of the sample used in column (4) of 
Table 8, which is 0.69 (=0.46/0.67).  
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gaining and losing Medicaid coverage via the ACA and the TennCare reform are asymmetric. 
We believe that investigating the robustness of this pattern and the possible mechanisms is 
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 1. Trends of Health Insurance Coverage  
 
 
Data source: Current Population Survey (March Supplement), 2003 to 2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. The outcome variable is the probability of any health insurance coverage. 




Figure 2. Trends of Overall Life Satisfaction 
 
 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
















































Figure 3. Trends of Overall Life Satisfaction by Alternative Control Groups 
 A.	Other	Northeastern	States B.	Synthetic	Massachusetts 
	 	C.	States	that	Experienced	Similar	Recessions	Shocks D.	Synthetic	Massachusetts	 using	States	that	Experienced	Similar	Recession	Shocks 
	 	
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. In panel A, we use other northeastern states as control states. In panel B, 
we use overall life satisfaction; age; the age squared dummy for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, the number of children; and dummies for 
marital status and college education to calculate state weights for synthetic Massachusetts. In panel C, we use Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont as control states that experienced similar recession shocks. In panel D, we use overall life 
satisfaction; age; the age squared; dummy for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, the number of children; and dummies for marital status and 
college education to calculate state weights for synthetic Massachusetts among states that experienced similar recession shocks. We use the 
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Figure 4. Distribution of “Fake” Treatment Effects 
 
 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. The solid vertical line indicates the baseline estimate. The dashed vertical 
lines indicate 5th and 95th percentile values of “fake” treatment effects. We include state-fixed effects; year-fixed effects; age; age squared 
number of children; and dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education as control variables. 




















Figure 5. Trends of Overall Life Satisfaction of the Elderly 
 
 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 





Figure 6. Trends of Differences in Overall Life Satisfaction (Non-elderly and Elderly) 
 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We plot differences in overall life satisfaction between the non-elderly and the elderly. We use the individual sampling weight as a 











































Figure 7. Trends of Overall Life Satisfaction among Individuals Aged 18 to 64 years:  
Other Healthcare Reforms 
 




B. 2005 Tennessee Medicaid Disenrollment 
 
 
Data sources: the PSID, 2009-2017 (panel A) and the BRFSS, 2005-2010 (panel B) 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged between 18 to 64 years. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
 Massachusetts Other	States Other	Northeastern	States States	used	for	Synthetic	Massachusetts 
States	with	Similar	Recession	Shocks 
Synthetic	Massachusetts	among	States	with	Similar	Recession	Shocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) A.	Overall	Life	Satisfaction Overall	Life	Satisfaction 3.39 (.65)						 3.39 (.63) 3.36 (.63) 3.36 (.65) 3.40 (.63) 3.39 (.65) Pr(Very	Dissatisfied) .01 (.11) .01 (.11) .01 (.10) .01 (.12) .01 (.11) .01 (.12) Pr(Dissatisfied) .05 (.22)												 .04 (.21)	 .04 (.23) .04 (.22) .04 (.21) .04 (.23) Pr(Satisfied) .49 (.50)											 .50 (.50)	 .52 (.50) .52 (.50) .48 (.50) .49 (.50) Pr(Very	Satisfied) .45 (.49) .45 (.50) .43 (.49) .43 (.50) .46 (.49) .46 (.49) 
       B.	Mental	Health Number	of	Days	of	Mental	Health	Not	Good	 in	the	Past	30	Days 
3.27 (7.93) 3.40 (7.67) 3.27 (7.93) 3.42 (7.93) 3.49 (7.92) 3.64 (8.26) 
       C.	Other	Characteristics Age 46.3 (17.0) 45.7 (17.2) 46.7 (16.9) 46.2 (17.1) 45.7 (17.1) 45.8 (17.2) Pr(Hispanic) .08 (.29) .14 (.26) .11 (.23) .10 (.23) .04 (.17) .05 (.18) Pr(Male) .47 (.49) .49 (.49) .47 (.49) .48 (.49) .48 (.48) .48 (.48) Pr(White) .21 (.45) .18 (.41) .17 (.43) .18 (.41) .18 .(41) .19 (.41) Number	of	Children .72 (1.05) .82 (1.09) .75 (1.03) .78 (1.05) .80 (1.07) .80 (1.08) Pr(Married) .56 (.50) .59	 (.50) .57 (.50) .57 (.50) .60 (.50) .61 (.49) Pr(College) .67 (.48)					 .58 (.49) .59 (.49) .58 (.49) .56 (.48) .57 (.50) Pr(Employed) .63 (.49) .61 (.49) .61 (.49) .62 (.49) .61 (.50) .62 (.50) Annual	Household	Income	Distribution Pr(<	$20K) .13 (.39) .19 (.40) .18 (.38) .17 (.39) .19 (.42) .18 (.41) Pr($20K	-	$35K) .17 (.39) .22 (.43) .21 (.41) .22 (.42) .23 (.43) .22 (.43) Pr($35K	-	$50K) .14 (.35) .16 (.38) .16 (.37) .16 (.36) .17 (.38) .17 (.38) Pr($50K	-	$75K) .18 (.38)					 .17 (.38)			 .17 (.38) .18 (.37) .17 (.37) .18 (.37) Pr(>$75K) .37 (.46) .25 (.41) .28 (.45) .27 (.44) .24 (.40) .26 (.40) 
Data Source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
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Table 2. Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform  




Overall Life Satisfaction Pr(Very Satisfied or 
Satisfied) 
Pr(Very Satisfied) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A. Baseline          
MA×Post 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Observations 1,599,569 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
         
B. Dynamic effects 1: (During: July 2006 to June 2007) 
MA×During 0.015*** -0.007*** 0.004* 0.005 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003* 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
MA×After 0.047*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Observations 1,599,569 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 
R-squared 0.000 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
         
C. Dynamic effects 2: (Post1: 2007 to 2008, Post2: 2009 to 2010) 
MA×Post1 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
MA×Post2 0.044*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Observations 1,599,569 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 
R-squared 0.000 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
         
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE   Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE   Y  Y  Y  
Year-Month 
FE 
   Y  Y  Y 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about overall life 
satisfaction in columns (1) to (4), a dummy variable indicating very satisfied or satisfied in columns (5) and (6), and a dummy variable 
indicating very satisfied in columns (7) and (8). For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables 
for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. 
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and 






Table 3. Heterogeneous Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform  
on Overall Life Satisfaction  
 
A. By Age 
Age groups 18 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 to 54 years 55 to 64 years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
MA×Post 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.009** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Observations 309,053 346,697 460,465 474,606 
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 
 
B. By Annual Household Income 
Income groups <$25,000 $25,000 to $75,000 >=$75,000 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
MA×Post 0.058*** 0.023*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
Observations 332,438 659,297 599,086 
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For the dependent variable, we use categorical responses about overall life 
satisfaction. For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, 
marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are 






Table 4. The Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform  
on Overall Life Satisfaction by Using Alternative Control Groups 
 








 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Alternative Control Group 1: Other Northeastern States 
MA×Post 0.029*** 0.012*** 0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Observations 311,548 311,548 311,548 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.05 
    
B. Alternative Control Group 2: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts 
MA×Post 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
    
Observations 301,651 301,651 301,651 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.06 
    
C. Alternative Control Group 3: States with Similar Recession Shocks 
MA×Post 0.032*** 0.008** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
    
Observations 266,524 266,524 266,524 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.05 
    
D. Alternative Control Group 4: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts 
among those with Similar Recession Shocks 
MA×Post 0.037*** 0.009** 0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
    
Observations 211,077 211,077 211,077 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.06 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. As alternative control groups, we use northeastern states in panel A; 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in panel B; 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont in panel C; and Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in panel 
D. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about overall life satisfaction in column (1), a dummy variable indicating very 
satisfied or satisfied in column (2), and a dummy variable indicating very satisfied in column (3). For control variables, we use age; age 
squared; number of children; dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the 
individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 








Days Mental Health Not Good during the Past 30 Days  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
MA×Post -0.165*** -0.161*** -0.144** -0.243*** -0.170*** 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.059) (0.071) (0.040) 
      
Observations 2,062,310 404,863 406,150 332,693 269,728 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
      
Control Group Other 50 States Other 
Northeastern 
States 














Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. As alternative control groups, we use Northeastern states in column (2); 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in column (3); 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont in column (4); and Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in 
column (5). For dependent variables, we use the number of days mental health was not good during the past 30 days. For control variables, 
we use age; age squared; number of children and dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college 
education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for 




Table 6. Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform  
on Overall Life Satisfaction Among the Elderly 
 







 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Control Group: Other 50 States 
MA×Post -0.010*** -0.002*** -0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
Observations 662,567 662,567 662,567 
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.04 
    
B. Alternative Control Group 1: Other Northeastern States 
MA×Post -0.0004 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Observations 126,238 126,238 126,238 
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.04 
    
C. Alternative Control Group 2: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts 
MA×Post -0.014 -0.004*** -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.001) (0.009) 
    
Observations 121,038 121,038 121,038 
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.04 
    
D. Alternative Control Group 3: States with Similar Recession Shocks 
MA×Post -0.022** -0.003 -0.018** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) 
    
Observations 110,869 110,869 110,869 
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.04 
    
E. Alternative Control Group 4: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts among 
those with Similar Recession Shocks 
MA×Post -0.017* -0.003 -0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) 
    
Observations 90,268 90,268 90,268 
R-squared 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 65 years or older. As alternative control groups, we use northeastern states in panel B; 
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in panel C; 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont in panel D; and Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in panel 
E. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about overall life satisfaction, a dummy variable indicating very satisfied or 
satisfied, and a dummy variable indicating very satisfied in columns (1) to (3), respectively. For control variables, we use age; age squared; 
number of children; and dummy variables for Hispanic and Caucasian ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use 
the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 




Table 7. Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform on Overall Life Satisfaction: 
Triple Difference in Differences Estimation  
 
Dependent Variables Overall Life Satisfaction Pr(Very Satisfied or Satisfied) Pr(Very Satisfied) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Control Group: Other 50 States 
MA×Post×Non-elderly 0.040*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
Observations 2,253,388 2,253,388 2,253,388 
R-squared 0.06 0.02 0.05 
    
B. Alternative Control Group 1: Other Northeastern States 
MA×Post×Non-elderly 0.027*** 0.013*** 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
    
Observations 437,786 437,786 437,786 
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.05 
    
C. Alternative Control Group 2: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts 
MA×Post×Non-elderly 0.038*** 0.014*** 0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.009) 
    
Observations 422,689 422,689 422,689 
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.05 
    
D. Alternative Control Group 3: States with Similar Recession Shocks 
MA×Post×Non-elderly 0.052*** 0.011*** 0.040*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
    
Observations 377,393 377,393 377,393 
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.05 
    
E. Alternative Control Group 4: States used for Synthetic Massachusetts among those with Similar Recession 
Shocks 
MA×Post×Non-elderly 0.052*** 0.012*** 0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) 
    
Observations 301,345 301,345 301,345 
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.05 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: As alternative control groups, we use northeastern states in panel B; Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in panel C; Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont in 
panel D; and Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in panel E. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about overall 
life satisfaction, a dummy variable indicating very satisfied or satisfied, and a dummy variable indicating very satisfied in columns (1) to 
(3), respectively. For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, 
white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 8. Effects of Other Healthcare Reforms on  
Health Insurance Coverage and Life Satisfaction 
 
Healthcare Reforms ACA Medicaid Expansion Tennessee Medicaid 
Disenrollment 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Treat×Post 0.042*** 0.052** -0.063*** -0.029*** 
 (0.008) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
Pre-periods Mean (SD) 0.12 3.74 0.88 3.38 
 (0.32) (0.86) (0.32) (0.67) 
     
Observations 17,102,379 107,887 553,785 530,100 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.06 
Data sources: American Community Survey, 2009 to 2017 for column (1), PSID, 2009-2017 for column (2), and BRFSS, 2005-2010 for 
columns (3) and (4) 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 19 to 64 years. For dependent variables, we use dummy variables indicating Medicaid 
coverage and any health insurance coverage in columns (1) and (3), and categorical responses about overall life satisfaction in columns (2) 
and (4). For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, 
marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, respectively. ACA = 











Table A1. List of States that Experienced Similar Recession Shocks 
 State Change	in	%	Employed Maryland -2.14% Nebraska -1.87% Kentucky -1.46% Massachusetts -1.35% Vermont -0.93% Louisiana -0.90% Oklahoma -0.43% 
Data source: Current Population Survey (March Supplement), 2007 to 2009 








Table A2. Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform  
on Overall Life Satisfaction:  




Overall Life Satisfaction Pr(Very Satisfied or 
Satisfied) 
Pr(Very Satisfied) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
MA×Post 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Observations 1,438,142 1,438,142 1,438,142 1,438,142 1,438,142 1,438,142 1,438,142 
R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 
        
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE  Y  Y  Y  
Year-Month 
FE 
  Y  Y  Y 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about life 
satisfaction in columns (1) to (3) and dummy variables indicating very satisfied or satisfied in columns (4) and (5) and indicating very 
satisfied in columns (6) and (7). For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; dummy variables for Hispanic ethnicity, 
gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1, 




Table A3. The Effects of the Massachusetts’ Health Reform on Overall Life Satisfaction: 




Overall Life Satisfaction Pr(Very Satisfied or 
Satisfied) 
Pr(Very Satisfied) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
MA×During 0.019*** -0.012*** 0.003 0.003 0.004*** 0.003** 0.002 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
MA×After 0.051*** 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Observations 1,599,569 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 1,590,821 
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
         
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE   Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE   Y  Y  Y  
Year-Month 
FE 
   Y  Y  Y 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about overall life 
satisfaction in columns (1) to (4), a dummy variable indicating very satisfied or satisfied in columns (5) and (6), and a dummy variable 
indicating very satisfied in columns (7) and (8). For control variables, we use age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables 
for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a probabilistic weight. 
Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent p<0.01, p<0.05, and 





Table A4. Heterogeneous Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform 
on Health Insurance Coverage 
 
A. By Age 
Age groups 18 to 34 years 35 to 44 years 45 to 54 years 55 to 64 years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
MA×Post 0.053*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
     
Observations 324,135 362,389 480,679 494,675 
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.07 
 
B. By Annual Household Income 
Income groups <$25,000 $25,000 to $75,000 >=$75,000 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
MA×Post 0.093*** 0.060*** 0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
    
Observations 352,260 682,866 626,752 
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.16 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010  
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For dependent variable, we use a dummy variable indicating any health 
insurance coverage. In all specifications, we control for state- and year-fixed effects; age; age squared; number of children; and dummy 
variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a 
probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent 




Table A5. State Weights in Synthetic Massachusetts  
  
A. Whole states 
 State Weight State Weight Alabama 0 Montana  0 Alaska 0 Nebraska  0 
Arizona  0 Nevada  0 
Arkansas  0 New Hampshire  0 
California  0 New Jersey  0.165 
Colorado  0 New Mexico  0 
Connecticut  0.267 New York  0.169 
Delaware  0 North Carolina  0 
District of Columbia  0.011 North Dakota  0 
Florida  0 Ohio  0 
Georgia  0 Oklahoma  0 
Hawaii  0 Oregon  0 
Idaho  0 Pennsylvania  0 
Illinois  0 Rhode Island  0.281 
Indiana  0.005 South Carolina  0 
Iowa  0 South Dakota  0 
Kansas  0 Tennessee  0 
Kentucky  0.012 Texas  0 
Louisiana  0 Utah  0 
Maine  0 Vermont  0 
Maryland  0 Virginia  0 
Michigan  0 Washington  0 
Minnesota  0 West Virginia  0 
Mississippi  0 Wisconsin  0.014 
Missouri  0.076 Wyoming  0 
 
 
B. States with Similar Recession Shocks 
 State Weight Kentucky 0.422 
Louisiana  0 
Maryland  0.111 
Nebraska  0.403 
Oklahoma  0.064 
Vermont  0 
Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010. 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. To calculate state weights in “synthetic Massachusetts,” we use categorical 
responses about overall life satisfaction, state and year fixed effects; age; age squared; number of children; and dummy variables for 
Hispanic ethnicity, gender, and white, and fixed effects for marital status, education, income category, and labor force status. 




Table A6. Ordered Logit Estimation of the Effects of the Massachusetts Healthcare Reform 




Overall Life Satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
MA×Post 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
      
Observations 1,590,821 311,548 301,651 259,028 211,077 
      
Control Group Other 50 States Other 
Northeastern 
States 












Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. For the control group, we use all states except for Massachusetts in column 
(1). As alternative control groups, we use northeastern states in column (2); Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in column (3); Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Vermont in 
column (4); and Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, and Oklahoma in column (5). For dependent variables, we use categorical responses about 
overall life satisfaction. In all specifications, we control for state- and year-fixed effects; age; age squared; number of children; and dummy 
variables for Hispanic ethnicity, gender, white, marital status, and college education. We use the individual sampling weight as a 
probabilistic weight. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state level. ***, **, and * represent 




Figure A1. Trends of Mental Health 
 
A. All other 50 states B. Northeastern States 
  
C. States used for synthetic Massachusetts D. States with similar recession shocks 
  
E. States used for synthetic Massachusetts 




Data source: BRFSS, 2005-2010 
Notes: We restrict the sample to individuals aged 18 to 64 years. As the dependent variable, we use the number of days mental health was not 
good during the past 30 days. As alternative control groups, we use northeastern states in panel B; Connecticut, District of Columbia, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin in panel C; Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 







































































































































2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
MA non-MA
